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On the morning of August 18, 1945, three days after the Japanese surrender and 
just a day after Indonesia's proclamation of independence, Mohammad Hatta, soon to 
be elected as vice-president of the infant republic, prevailed upon delegates at the first 
meeting of the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI, Committee for the 
Preparation of Indonesian Independence) to adjust key aspects of the republic's draft 
constitution, notably its preamble. The changes enjoined by Hatta on members of the 
Preparation Committee, charged with finalizing and promulgating the constitution, 
were made quickly and with little dispute. Their effect, however, particularly the 
removal of seven words stipulating that all Muslims should observe Islamic law, was 
significantly to reduce the proposed formal role of Islam in Indonesian political and 
social life. Episodically thereafter, the actions of the PPKI that day came to be 
castigated by some Muslims as catastrophic for Islam in Indonesia—indeed, as an act 
of treason* 1—and efforts were put in train to restore the seven words to the 
constitution.2 In retracing the history of the drafting of the Jakarta Charter in June 1945,
* This research was supported under the Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects funding 
scheme. I am grateful for the helpful comments on and assistance with an earlier draft of this article that I 
received from John Butcher, Ananda B. Kusuma, Gerry van Klinken, Tomoko Aoyama, Akh Muzakki, and 
especially an anonymous reviewer.
1 Anonymous, "Naskah Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945: Pengkhianatan Pertama terhadap Piagam Jakarta?," 
Suara Hidayatullah 13,5 (2000): 13-14. See also Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, "Pencoretan Tujuh Kata Bencana bagi 
Ummat Islam," Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syari'ah Islam, ed. Irfan S. Awwas (Yogyakarta: 
Wihdah Press, 2001), p. 244.
2See AdnanBuyung Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study 
of the Indonesian Konstituante 1956-1959 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992), pp. 358-60, 388-97; and
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the subsequent debates about its significance among Indonesian leaders seeking to 
draft a constitution, and its August 18 pruning, I attempt to solve the many unresolved 
puzzles that surround that history. More important, I argue that later Islamist reactions 
to the excision of the seven words, fuelled by contemporary concerns and struggles, 
are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Charter and of the 
fraught politics surrounding its development, and that Hatta's actions in securing key 
amendments to the draft constitution were themselves panicked, unnecessary, and 
even counterproductive.
Indonesian Islam and Politics in the Pre-War Period
For much of the period up to the Japanese occupation of the Indies in 1942, 
Indonesian Islam had exerted little influence on indigenous politics. While Sarekat 
Islam (Islamic Association), the mass organization led by Umar Said Cokroaminoto, 
had stimulated much interest (and, on the part of the Dutch, much anxiety), it was no 
Islamist organization.3 Only when its popularity waned in the context of contestation 
with the Indonesian Communist Party in the late 1910s and early 1920s did the section 
of its leadership that was devoutly Muslim began to push a more Islamist line. That, in 
turn, led to a further decline in popularity, to internal division and rancor, and, only in 
the last part of the 1930s, to an effort to rejoin the mainstream of indigenous political 
activism. By the time World War II reached the Pacific and broke upon Indonesia, 
Indonesian Islam remained marginalized and relatively unimportant in a political 
sense, as well as remaining heavily constrained and controlled by the Dutch. Islam 
itself was greatly overshadowed by a form of political thinking usually called "secular 
nationalism," which privileged the idea of a free Indonesia as the goal to be achieved, 
and which sought, above all, the unity of all Indonesians, whatever their ethnicity and 
form of belief, as the sole means of obtaining hoped-for independence.
Islam and the Japanese Occupation
The period of Japanese occupation brought some significant change to that state of 
affairs. Under the leadership of the redoubtable Colonel Horie Choso, the Japanese 
made a conscious effort to influence Muslim sentiment in support of their cause, 
directing their attentions especially to recruiting the support of Javanese kiai (Muslim 
religious teachers).4 Establishing short-term courses for thousands of kiai, and longer 
courses for madrasah (Islamic school) teachers, the Japanese hoped thereby both to
Nadirsyah Hosen, "Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate," Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 36,3 (2005): 419-40.
3 See R. E. Elson, "Islam, Islamism, the Nation, and the Early Indonesian Nationalist Movement," Journal of 
Indonesian Islam 1,2 (2007): 250; and "Disunity, Distance, Disregard: The Political Failure of Islamism in 
Late Colonial Indonesia," Studia Islamika 16,1 (2009): 1-50.
4 "Uit een Ambtelijke Nota bestemd voor de C.C.O.-A.M.A-C.A.B. te Batavia. 2 Febr. 1946," in Nederlands- 
Indie onder Japanse Bezetting: Gegevens en Documenten over de Jaren 1942-1945, ed. I. J. Brugmans et al. 
(Franeker: T. Wever, 1960), pp. 537-40. See also Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian 
Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942-1945 (The Hague: W. vanHoeve, 1958), pp. 107-10,132-33; 
Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup itu Berjuang: Kasman Singodimedjo 75 Tahun (fakarta: Bulan 
Bintang, 1982), p. 51; and C. A. O. Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague:
W. van Hoeve, 1958), pp. 115-17.
Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy 107
instruct these local religious teachers and ingratiate themselves with them.5 The 
Japanese message was that they respected and would protect Islam ("honoring and 
valuing the Religion of Islam," in the words of the Nahdlatul Ulama leader Wahid 
Hasyim in 1944),6 something emphasized by Lieutenant-General Imamura's request for 
Muslim forbearance at any unintended slights of Islam by the Japanese.7 In the same 
spirit, the Japanese military regime "sponsored" the public celebration of the Prophet's 
birthday in Ikada Square in March 1944,8 and eventually withdrew the much resented 
requirement to bow in the direction of the emperor.9 The unspoken text, of course, was 
that Muslims should in turn respect and be loyal to the military regime, and support 
the (appropriately religiously tinged)10 Japanese war effort.
Furthermore, the Japanese established an Office of Religious Affairs (Shimubu), 
installed religious offices (Shumuka) in every residency, and permitted the re­
establishment of the pre-war Muslim organization MIAI (Majelis Islamil a'la Indonesia, 
Islamic High Council of Indonesia), itself replaced in November 1943 by Masyumi 
(Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Consultative Council for Indonesian Muslims), to 
serve as an instrument of Japanese intentions.11 Both organizations were permitted to 
publish journals, much of their content taken up with condemnation of the evils of the 
anti-Islamic Allies and of Western imperialism more generally.12 The Leiden-trained 
Husein Jayadiningrat, appointed as head of Shimubu in October 1943, became the most 
senior Indonesian official in the Japanese administration, but his former close ties with 
the Dutch, his aristocratic background, and his lack of credibility as an Islamic adept 
saw him replaced by an elderly and revered Muslim figure, the Jombang-born founder
5 "Latihan Oelama Seloeroeh Djawa," Soeara May 15,1943; Benda, The Crescent, pp. 134—36;
Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects, p. 130. Lists of religious teachers who underwent training may be found in 
Archief van de Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indie, (1936) 1945-1949 
(1969), no. 1008, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
6 "Melenjapkan yang Kolot," Suara Muslimin Indonesia, June 1,1944, in H. Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup K. H. 
A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar (Jakarta: Panitya Buku Peringatan Aim. K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim,
1957), p. 919. See also Wiwoho Poerbohadidjojo, "Soal Islam di Indonesia: Sebeloem dan Sesoedah 8 Maret 
2602," Asia-Raya oentoek Memperingati Enam Boelan Balatentara Dai-Nippon Melindoengi Indonesia (n.p.: n.p. 
[1942]), n.p.; Soekiman Wirjosandjojo, Peranan Ummat Islam Indonesia (n.p.: n.p., 195?), p. 8; A. Salam Yahja, 
"Sekoetoe Moesoeh Islam," Soeara M.I.A.I., June 1,1943; "Outline of the Conduct of Military 
Administration in Occupied Areas" [March 14,1942], in ]apanese Military Administration in Indonesia:
Selected Documents, ed. Harry J. Benda, James J. Irikura, and Koichi Kishi (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1965), pp. 29-30; "Dasar Politik Dai Nippon terhadap Kaoem Moeslimin," Soeara 
M.I.A.I., March 1,1943; "Maksoed Nippon," Soeara M.I.A.I., March 15,1943.
7 Harun Nasution, "The Islamic State in Indonesia: The Rise of the Ideology, the Movement for Its 
Creation, and the Theory of the Masjumi" (MA dissertation, McGill University, 1965), pp. 47-48. Japanese 
insistence on maintaining Tokyo time in Java, ninety minutes earlier than Java time, was one of the slights 
of Islam by the Japanese; Pringgodigdo notes that "not a few Muslims used two clocks: a clock which 
showed Japanese time in the front room, with a clock on Java time inside." See A. G. Pringgodigdo, 
Tatanegara di Djawa pada Waktu Pendudukan Djepang dari Bulan Maret sampai Bulan Desember 1942 
(Yogyakarta: Jajasan Fonds Universiti Negeri Gadjah Mada, 1952), p. 15.
8 "Maleise Stukken," March 8,1944, in Nederlands-Indie, ed. Brugmans et al., p. 544.
9 Nasution, "The Islamic State," p. 49; Benda, The Crescent, p. 124. The single Indonesian on the platform at 
a conference in Bandung in 1943, Abdul Karim Amrullah, a senior Muslim figure and father of the 
emerging Hamka, had famously refused to participate in the ceremonial Japanese bow (seikeret).
10 Asia Raya, December 10,1942, in Nederlands-Indie, ed. Brugmans et al., p. 542; "Madjoe Serempak 
Membela Tanah Air," Djawa Baroe, October 1,1943, p. 3.
11 Benda, The Crescent, pp. 142-56; Nasution, "The Islamic State," pp. 49-50.
12 See, for example, Soeara M.I.A.I., June 1,1943, p. 12.
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of Nahdlatul Ulama, K. H. Hasyim Asy'ari, also general chairman of Masyumi, whose 
direct administrative contribution was slight but whose religious reputation was 
weighty.13 Shimubu was responsible for conducting the kiai courses, as well as 
distributing Islamic material.14 The Japanese also permitted the development, under 
Masyumi's auspices, of the paramilitary Hizbullah late in 1944.15 When the Japanese 
military administration moved late in 1942 to establish Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakyat, 
Center of the People's Strength), a purportedly popular indigenous movement, to 
promote its aims, it appointed as one of Putera's four leaders the senior 
Muhammadiyah figure K. H. Mas Mansur.16 Even the volunteer army, Peta, 
established by the Japanese in late 1943, had a significant Muslim flavor.17 In short, 
Muslim leaders received a heightened sense of their own importance under the 
Japanese, although that never translated into a sense that Muslim figures would be 
permitted a significant political role. With the declaration in September 1944 by Prime 
Minister Koiso Kuniaki that Indonesia would receive its independence "later on," and 
in the context of the rapidly deteriorating war situation, local Japanese preference for 
secular-minded Indonesian political leaders—and the Japanese's underlying 
apprehensions about Islam18—was more clearly revealed.19 If one weighs political 
influence and leadership, indeed, "Islam did not fare much better under the Japanese 
than under the Dutch."20 Muslim leaders' optimism that a free Indonesia would be the 
means to attain a state based on Islam, at least in some form,21 would soon be dashed.
Making a Constitution
While the Japanese were conscious of the need to consolidate Indonesian support 
for the war effort with the promise of independence, made in September 1944, it was 
not until March 1, 1945, that the Japanese military government announced that it 
would establish a body, the Committee to Investigate Preparations for Independence 
(Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, BPUPK),22 to consider "the
13 Benda, The Crescent, pp. 136,165-66, 273n.; Nasution, "The Islamic State," pp. 50-51; Nieuwenhuijze, 
Aspects, p. 158.
14 Kobayashi Yasuko, "Kyai and Japanese Military," Studia Islamika 4,3 (1997): 75-92.
15 "Uit het Verhoor van een Japans Officier, 3-8 Maart 1947," in Nederlands-Indie, ed. Brugmans et al., pp. 
544-45; Benda, The Crescent, p. 179; Darul Aqsha, Kiai Haji Mas Mansur (1896-1946): Perjuangan dan 
Pemikiran (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2002), p. 65.
16 Djawa Baroe, January 1,1943, pp. 12-13.
17 Benda, The Crescent, pp. 138,140-41; Aqsha, Kiai Haji Mas Mansur, p. 65.
18 Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup, p. 336.
19 Nasution, "The Islamic State," p. 54.
20 Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study in the Political Bases o f Legal Institutions (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 33. See also Benda, The Crescent, p. 187; George Sanford Kanahele, 
"The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 
1967), p. 72; Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Japan: 'The Light of Asia/" in Southeast Asia in World War II: Four 
Essays, ed. Josef Silverstein (New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1966), pp. 18-20.
21 See Kahar Muzakkir's speech, delivered shortly after the Koiso declaration, and the considerations and 
decisions of the Masyumi meeting in Jakarta in October 1944, in Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup, pp. 339-41; 
and A. Wahid Hasjim, in Asia Raya, May 11,1945.
22 When the Japanese established the BPUPK, they called it (in Indonesian) the "Badan oentoek menjelidiki 
oesaha-oesaha persiapan kemerdekaan" (see Soeara Asia, March 1,1945; Pandji Poestaka, March 15,1945; 
and Asia Raya, May 28,1945). But it was also frequently called the "Badan Penjelidik Oesaha(-oesaha)
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practical problems of self-government"23 and to develop the apparatus, political and 
administrative, of the new state.24 Nearly two months more passed before the BPUPK 
was formally established and another month before its composition, comprising 
"representatives from all layers of the Indonesian population,"25 selected by 
Lieutenant-General Nagano Yuichiro,26 was made public. The sixty-two strong 
Indonesian membership of the BPUPK, chaired by the respected Javanese nationalist 
Rajiman Wediodiningrat, was generally of conservative and cautious demeanor, 
unrepresentatively elderly,27 heavily weighted toward Java (its membership was 
drawn entirely from Indonesians resident in Java), and—notwithstanding assertions 
that it was representative of different groups and streams of thinking28—largely 
peopled by delegates known to favor a religiously neutral form of territorial 
nationalism.29 It even contained a number of Freemasons.30 Muslim figures (that is, 
those who made their careers as representatives of Muslim ideas and practice) made 
up less than one-quarter of the assembly, with young Muslim activists weakly 
represented.31 In May 1945, Major-General Nishimura Otoshi, head of the Department 
of General Affairs, made Japanese indifference on Islam's position in the new state 
clear: "While we clearly appreciate the bonds which exist between the Indonesian 
people and Islam, the Dai Nippon authorities have not the slightest blueprint or plan
Persiapan Kemerdekaan" (see Asia Raya, May 28 and 30,1945; Sinar Baroe, May 28,1945). Officially, it was 
most frequently referred to by its Japanese name, "Dokuritu Zyunbi Tyoosakai" (Hepburn romanization, 
Dokuritsu Junbi Chosa Kai) (see Soeara Asia, March 29,1945).
23 "The Indonesian independence movement in Java (interrogation of Watanabe, Hiroshi, on Galang 
Island, Rhio Archipelago, 23rd May, 1947)," Indische Collectie, no. 005807-5814, NIOD (Netherlands 
Institute for War Documentation). For the announcement of the BPUPK's creation, see Pandji Poestaka, 
March 1,1945.
24 The BPUPK's authority was based upon the Japanese 16th Army, which was responsible for Java and 
Madura; indeed, the decree announcing the establishment of the BPUPK spoke of "preparations for 
independence in the region of the Government of this island of Java" ("Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia," Pandji Poestaka, March 1,1945). Sumatra, controlled by the 25th Army, established a similar 
body only on July 25, which was, in the event, of no consequence for the course of events. See Benedict R. 
O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects o f Indonesian Politics under the Japanese Occupation: 1944—1945 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1961), p. 36.
25 "Ketetapan Hati Para Iin Badan Penyelidik," in A. B. Kusuma, Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar 1945: 
Memuat Salinan Dokumen Otentik Badan Oentoek Menyelidiki Oesaha2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Jakarta: Badan 
Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2004), p. 94.
26 Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 11. Sukarno, characteristically, claims that delegates were "chosen by me and 
approved by the Japanese"—see Sukarno, An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams (Indianapolis, IN: Bobs- 
Merrill, 1965), p. 196.
27 Anderson notes that only two members were aged thirty-four or less, and the average age of members 
was forty-eight (Some Aspects, p. 20).
28 Anwar Tjokroaminoto, "Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia," Djawa Baroe, May 1,1945, p. 8.
29 According to Prawoto Mangkusasmito, its membership numbered only fifteen people "who could be 
thought of as exponents of the Islamic group" (Pertumbuhan Historis Rumus Dasar Negara dan Sebuah 
Proyeksi (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1970), p. 12. In that sense, its composition was not widely different from 
that of the Cuo Sangi-in; its twenty-three directly appointed members included only four men who could 
be termed Islamic leaders: K. H. Bagus Hadikusumo, K. H. Abdul Halim, K. H. Mas Mansur, and K. H. 
Wahid Hasyim ("Angkatan Anggota Tjoeo Sangi-in," Djawa Baroe, October 1,1943, p. 6).
30 C. G. van Wering, The Treemasons in Budi Utomo (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), p. 50.
31 See Nasution, "The Islamic State," p. 55; Yuzril Ihza, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: The 
Biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)," Studia Islamika 2,1 (1995): 124; and Irfan S. Awwas, Trilogi 
Kepemimpinan Negara Islam Indonesia: Menguak Perjuangan Umat Islam dan Pengkhianatan Kaum Nasionalis- 
Sekuler (Yogyakarta: Uswah, 2008), p. 121.
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concerning the place which the Islamic religion should occupy in the government, or 
what the relationship should be between Islam and other religions."32
The BPUPK met in two short, concentrated sessions over the following two 
months.33 Its first session was broadly devoted to discussion of the ideological 
underpinnings of the proposed new state—including, according to one delegate, the 
"feeling of religiosity, the feeling of devotion towards the One and Only God,"34 and, 
according to another, the need to establish Islam as the state religion.35 It soon became 
clear that a central—and difficult—component of the debate would be the place of 
religion, or, more specifically, Islam, in the architecture of the gestating state. From the 
beginning, Hatta and the renowned Dutch-trained legal scholar Supomo set 
themselves sharply against the notion of an Islamic state (where "state and religion are
32 Quoted in Benda, The Crescent, p. 188.
33 There are significant deficiencies in the stenographic record of the BPUPK debates. Large portions of 
material have been lost—for example, Mohammad Hatta's one-hour speech on May 30, the second day of 
debate (Asia Raya, May 31,1945). Some major portions of the debates were published in Muhammad 
Yamin, Naskah-Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), but Yamin 
omitted many speeches and even the entirety of the debates conducted on July 17. He also inserted the text 
of a speech he allegedly presented on May 29, together with appendices; yet the speech he actually 
delivered was much shorter and less far-ranging than what appears in his book (Yamin was just one of 
seven speakers scheduled to speak in a two-hour session), and his speech did not include a systematic 
draft constitution resembling the constitution finally agreed upon. About the foregoing, see Panitia Lima 
(Mohammad Hatta et al.), Uraian Pancasila (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1977), pp. 75,100-01,105; Kusuma, Lahirnya, 
pp. 97-99, 540; Deliar Noer, Mohammad Hatta: Biografi Politik (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990), p. 220; and Soemali 
Prawirosoedirdjo et al., Sejarah Lahirnya Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 dan Pancasila (Jakarta: Inti Udayu 
Press, 1984), pp. 94,100-01,103-05,108-10. Yamin based his work on the stenographic notes of the BPUPK 
and PPKI borrowed indirectly from A. G. Pringgodigdo, deputy head of the BPUPK secretariat and head 
of its stenographic team. It is known that Pringgodigdo lent out his documents to more than one person, 
and Notonagoro clearly made use of them in his Pemboekaan Oendang-Oendang Dasar 1945 (Yogyakarta: 
Penerbitan mengenai Pantjasila, nomor kedua, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1957), and Noer used them in 
the mid-1950s. In any event, Yamin did not return the documents to Pringgodigdo and they remained 
undiscovered for many years. He also borrowed, and never returned, documents and notes from Hatta 
(see also Noer, Mohammad Hatta, pp. 221-22). Controversy arose in the early period of the New Order as a 
consequence of a move, spearheaded by New Order ideologue Nugroho Notosusanto, to deny or diminish 
Sukarno's reputation and especially to deprecate his claim to sole authorship of the ideology of Pancasila; 
see Nugroho Notosusanto, Naskah Proklamasi yang Otentik dan Rumusan Pancasila yang Otentik (Jakarta:
Balai Pustaka, 1978), pp. 20-23; Nugroho Notosusanto, "Mengamankan Pancasila Dasar Negara," in 
Soerowo Abdoelmanap, Republik Indonesia Menggugat (Jakarta: Pustaka Grafiksi, 1997 [1979]), especially 
pp. 269-70, 273-78; and Nugroho Notosusanto, Proses Perumusan Pancasila Dasar Negara (Jakarta: Balai 
Pustaka, 1981), pp. 14-32. Subsequently, a research team commissioned by the state secretariat produced a 
revised edition, based on Yamin's text (apart from using contemporary spelling, the edition simply 
reordered the material thematically, added some explanatory notes, and appended biographical data of 
the members of the two bodies). A third edition, published in 1995, included material from the so-called 
Collectie A. K. Pringgodigdo, held until their return to the Arsip Nasional, Jakarta, in the Nationaal 
Archief in The Hague (Algemene Secretarie en de daarbij gedeponeerde archieven, nos. 5645—47), and 
purportedly seized by the Dutch upon their capture of Yogyakarta in December 1949, and Yamin's papers 
(which included the documents borrowed from Pringgodigdo), which had been deposited in the 
Mangkunegaran library in Solo. This third edition made a number of corrections to Yamin's text. A fourth 
edition, published in 1998, was noteworthy for the addition of a speech by Hadikusumo obtained from 
another source. In 2004, A. B. Kusuma published his monumental Lahirnya Undang-undang Dasar 1945: 
Memuat Salinan Dokumen Otentik Badan Oentoek Menyelidiki Oesaha2 Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Jakarta: Badan 
Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2004); he includes in his edition of the debates a large 
number of additional speeches and documents from the official proceedings, from the meetings held while 
the BPUPK was in recess, and from individuals. Much of this material comes from the A. K. Pringgodigdo 
archive. Kusuma also made a significant number of corrections to the text of earlier editions.
^Susanto Tirtoprojo [speech of May 29], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 112.
35 A. Rachim Pratalykrama [speech of May 30], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 120.
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one") and argued for "a united national state which separates the affairs of state and 
the affairs of Islam."36 In defending his view, Supomo pointed to Indonesia's geo­
political position; he also noted that in Islamic states like Egypt, Iran, and Iraq there 
were contesting views regarding how Islamic law (syariah) might best be 
accommodated with the demands of internationalism and modernity. In Indonesia, 
there was, as well, the problem that those affiliated with religions other than Islam 
would find it difficult to "unite themselves with the state."37 What Supomo wanted 
was "a state which will not unite itself with the largest group, but which can stand 
above all groups, but which can pay regard to and respect the peculiar features of all 
groups, both large and small."38 Such a state might allow full freedom of religion and 
allow the adherents of all religions to "feel at home" in the state. The state would not, 
however, be indifferent to religion; it would embrace as its basis the moral values 
proposed by religion, including love and devotion to state and country and submission 
to God: "I am convinced that foundations such as these are recommended by Islam."39
In stark contrast, the prominent Yogyakarta modernist Islamic scholar and 
Muhammadiyah leader Ki Bagus Hadikusumo,40 developing the notion that the 
growth of human goodness in all its aspects was a product of following the directions 
of God, sought to "build up the State on the basis of the teaching of Islam,"41 although 
he acknowledged the need for freedom of religion.42 In his view, "the religion of Islam 
is able and sufficient, as well as proper and fitting, to become the pivot of national 
governance in this our state of Indonesia,"43 although he provided no specific sense of 
how that governance might operate in practice. With Hadikusumo's speech, the lines 
of difference between secularists and those Muslim figures who had presumed to 
parlay the enhanced significance and prestige they had achieved under the Japanese 
into a claim for Islam as the basis for an independent Indonesian state (although what 
that might mean remained unclear)44 were clearly drawn.
The debates climaxed on June 1 with the famous Pancasila speech of Sukarno, 
which unambiguously based Indonesia on nationalism rather than Islam. The purpose 
of establishing a free and independent Indonesia, he proclaimed, was "not for one 
person, not for one group, the group of nationalists, or the group of the rich, but 'all for 
all'... The first basis, which should become the basis for the State of Indonesia, that is 
the basis of nationalism."45 For Sukarno, Islamic ideals might best emerge not a priori 
but only through contestation in the representative organs of the state, and if Muslims
36 Supomo [speech of May 31], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 128. Hatta's views are evident from Supomo's 
summary of them. Hatta had already enunciated his position on the relation of Islam to the state in 
response to an earlier request posed by the Sanyo Kaigi (Council of Advisors); he emphasized that the 
Qur'an was not a proper basis for state law and called for a separation "of religious affairs and state 
affairs" (Hatta, cited in Lev, Islamic Courts, p. 40).
37 Supomo [speech of May 31], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, pp. 129-30.
35 Ibid., p. 130.
39 Ibid.
40 Hadikusumo had accompanied Sukarno and Hatta on their visit to Japan in late 1943.
41 Hadikusumo [speech of May 31], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 139.
42 Ibid., pp. 142-43.
43 Ibid., p. 143.
44 Nasution, "The Islamic State," p. 55.
45 Sukarno [speech of June 1], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 156.
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peopled the legislative body in numbers proportionate to their share of the Indonesian 
population, then "the laws which emerge from the People's Representative Council 
will be Islamic laws."46 The Indonesia Sukarno sought would be a Godly (ber-Tuhan) 
state, in which religion was revered and in which mutual tolerance and freedom of 
belief would be prized.47
The Emergence of the Jakarta Charter
Before its recess, the BPUPK appointed an eight-member subcommittee (Panitia 
Kecil) headed by Sukarno, with the task of consolidating, as far as possible, the various 
suggestions submitted by delegates for later discussion.48 During the subsequent 
recess, a large number of BPUPK delegates—subcommittee members, members of the 
Cuo Sangi-in (Central Advisory Council, the body established in September 1943 to 
provide advice to the Japanese)49 who were also BPUPK members, and other BPUPK 
members who happened to be in Jakarta at the time (in all, thirty-eight)—met at 
Sukarno's bidding. On Sukarno's initiative—outside the authority of the BPUPK—they 
handed the task of beginning the constitution-drafting process to another small 
working committee of nine members (Panitia Sembilan).50 That small group, working 
in the afternoon of June 22 in Sukarno's house, developed a constitutional preamble 
that sought to capture the central values expressed in Sukarno's Pancasila speech. 
Much of the initial drafting was the work of Yamin,51 and the preamble was notable for 
its inclusion of the stipulation, apparently at the insistence of Kahar Muzakkir and 
Wahid Hasyim,52 that all Muslims were obliged to carry out Islamic law ("dengan 
kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya," "with the obligation for its 
adherents to carry out Islamic law"), something with which, Muzakkir later alleged,
46 Ibid., p. 161.
47 Ibid., pp. 163-64.
48 A. G. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Singkat Berdirinja Negara Republik Indonesia (Surabaya: Pustaka Indonesia, 
1958), p. 27. The members of that subcommittee were Sukarno, Hatta, Yamin, A. A. Maramis, Sutarjo 
Kartohadikusumo, Oto Iskandardinata, Wahid Hasyim, and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (Kusuma, Lahirnya, 
pp. 4-5). This committee-of-eight is not to be confused with the committee-of-nine discussed in footnote 
50, as some authors do (see, for example, Abdoelmanap, Republik Indonesia Menggugat, pp. 29-30, who 
mistakenly inserts Subarjo into the committee appointed by the BPUPK, when he was, in fact, a member of 
the more informal—and more crucial—committee-of-nine).
49 See Arniati Prasedyawati Herkusumo, Chuo Sangi-in: Dewan Perimbangan Pusat pada Masa Pendudukan 
Jepang (Jakarta: Rosda-Jayaputra, 1984). According to Benda, "there were six prominent Muslims among 
the forty-three members of the Chuo Sangi-in" (The Crescent, p. 137).
50 See Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Singkat, pp. 27-28; and Anderson, Some Aspects, p. 26. The nine members 
were Sukarno, Hatta, Yamin, Maramis, Subarjo, Wahid Hasyim, Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, and 
Abikusno Cokrosuyoso. This committee had a significantly different composition from the eight-member 
committee appointed by the BPUPK (see footnote 48). On the nationalist side, Subarjo replaced Sutarjo and 
Iskandardinata; on the Islamic side, Muzakkir replaced Hadikusumo, while two extra members of this 
group, Salim and Abikusno, were appointed. It is not clear why these precise personnel changes were 
made, although Kusuma suggests that "Sukarno carried out a policy of changing the proportion between 
the 'Nationalist Group' and the 'Islamic Group' so that it became five [members] to four" (Kusuma, 
Lahirnya, pp. 5n.-6n.; Sukarno [July 10] in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 213). It may also be the case that Muzakkir 
replaced Hadikusumo because the much more senior and esteemed Hadikusumo was thought to be 
attached to the notion of an Islamic state (personal communication with Ananda B. Kusuma, January 22, 
2009).
51 Prawirosoedirdjo et al., Sejarah, pp. 103-04.
52Noer, Mohammad Hatta, p. 223.
Another Look at the Jakarta Charter Controversy 113
the Menadonese Christian Maramis had agreed "200%."53 It was not, Supomo later 
emphasized, the intention of this "recent compromise" to "place limits upon the 
freedom of people to have different religions, absolutely not!"54 The draft preamble, 
soon labeled by Yamin the "Jakarta Charter" (Piagam Jakarta),55 rearranged the 
sequence of Sukarno's five Pancasila principles and placed "belief in one God" in first 
position.56 Sukarno, long an advocate of the separation of religion and the state57—as 
indeed was Maramis—was prepared to sponsor this vague compromise in order to 
speed the achievement of the greater goal of a unified, independent Indonesia. The 
Charter was, it seems, another example of "Sukarno's deliberate simplifications in order 
to find a common denominator."58 And vague it was; it was never made clear whether the 
wording was meant purely as a symbolic but sterile recognition of Islam's importance 
in Indonesian society, or as a means of insinuating Islam into the state apparatus.59
During the recess, a number of papers relating to key aspects of the form, shape, 
and functions of the future state, as well as the means to progress towards that goal, 
were compiled, based on numerous written and oral suggestions and a number of 
drafts by BPUPK members.60 That task of compilation was the work of the Panitia Kecil 
appointed by the BPUPK on June 1, not the Panitia Sembilan responsible for the Jakarta 
Charter. One of those papers, the document on the basis of the state, made it clear that 
there was still, notwithstanding Sukarno's June 1 address, some support, limited in 
size but emphatic in style, for an Islamic form of the state.61
When the BPUPK reconvened on July 10 for its second (and final) session,62 
Sukarno reported on the work achieved during the recess. He noted, among other
53 Deliar Noer, interview with Kahar Muzakkir, Bandung, December 1957, in Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional 
1945-1965 (Jakarta: Grafitipers, 1987), p. 36.
54 Supomo [speech of July 15], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 359.
55 Ibid., p. 329.
56 The text of the Jakarta Charter, as read to the BPUPK by Sukarno on July 10, may be found in Kusuma, 
Lahirnya, p. 213-14. That text underwent significant change as it was integrated into a joint "declaration of 
independence" and preamble, but the seven words remained. See the draft joint "declaration of 
independence" and preamble presented to the BPUPK by Sukarno on July 14 (Kusuma, Lahirnya, pp. 324— 
27).
57 Bernhard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1969), p. 205.
58 Ibid., p. 194 (emphasis in original).
59 B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia, rev. ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 27. 
The BPUPK debates make clear that, even among themselves, Muslim figures did not agree on what the 
implications of the seven words might be. Thus, Hasyim and Muzakkir argued that they implied that the 
president must be a Muslim, a view with which Salim and Abikusno disagreed because it conflicted with 
the notion of social equality (Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 22).
60 See Rajiman's radio address in Asia Raya, June 7,1945. Nine of these papers may be found in Kusuma, 
Lahirnya, pp. 171-89. Three have been lost. See also Sukarno [July 10], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 208. Many 
members of the BPUPK took advantage of the recess to travel extensively, both to inform people about the 
BPUPK's work and to gauge public reaction to it (see, for example, the report on the visit by Samsudin and 
Haji Sanusi to their home region of Sukabumi, and on a similar meeting in Yogyakarta attended by Ki 
Hajar Dewantoro and other BPUPK members, in Asia Raya, June 7,1945). Sukarno had already traveled to 
eastern Indonesia at the beginning of May (Asia Raya, May 3 and 4,1945), while Hatta had traveled to 
Borneo in late May-early June (Asia Raya, June 4,1945). See also Sukarno [July 10], in Kusuma, Lahirnya,
p. 212; and "Uit het Verslag van Generaal-Majoor Moichiro Yamamoto," in Nederlands-Indie, ed. Brugmans 
et al., p. 587.
61 "Dasar," in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 175.
62 Six new members were introduced; see Rajiman [July 10], Ibid., p. 206.
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things, that "truly there have been difficulties, in the beginning between the group 
calling itself Islamic and the group calling itself nationalist. Indeed, there were 
difficulties in seeking harmony in thinking between these two groups."63 The Jakarta 
Charter, produced by the Panitia Sembilan, had been "unanimously" accepted by the 
Panitia Kecil for presentation to the BPUPK upon its resumption;64 indeed, "the greater 
part of all the thinking at its heart," Sukarno remarked, "[comes] from the members of 
the Dokuritu Zyunbi Tyoosakai [BPUPK]."65 The Panitia Kecil was therefore 
"convinced that this preamble can connect and unite all the streams [of thinking] 
among the members of the Dokuritu Zyunbi Tyoosakai."66
The BPUPK session then moved to consider the major questions of state and nation 
construction. It agreed that Indonesia should be a republic67 and that the new nation 
should comprise the territory of the former Dutch East Indies together with Malaya, 
the former British territories in Borneo, and the former Portuguese territory of Timor.68 
The assembly also considered the question of citizenship,69 and a nineteen-person 
committee,70 chaired by Sukarno but dominated intellectually by the eminent jurist 
Supomo, produced a draft constitution in less than three days.71
63 Sukarno [speech of July 10], Ibid., p. 213.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 214.
66 Ibid.
67 Kusuma [speech of July 10], Lahirnya, p. 238.
“ Kusuma [speech of July 11], Lahirnya, p. 262.
69 See, for example, Lim Kun Hian, in Kusuma [speech of July 11], Lahirnya, pp. 266-70. See also his speech 
of July 15, pp. 392-395; and Baswedan's of the same date, pp. 396-98.
70 The membership of the constitution-drafting committee comprised Sukarno, Maramis, Puruboyo, Oto 
Iskandardinata, Agus Salim, Subarjo, Supomo, Santoso, Wahid Hasyim, Harahap, Latuharhary, Susanto, 
Sartono, Wongsonegoro, Wuryaningrat, Singgih, Tan Eng Hoa, Jayadiningrat, and Sukiman. Sukarno, 
Maramis, and Wahid Hasyim were also on the committee-of-eight and the committee-of-nine; Oto 
Iskandardinata was also on the committee-of-eight; Agus Salim and Subarjo were also on the committee- 
of-nine. Hatta and Yamin were on both the committee-of-eight and the committee-of-nine, but not the 
constitution-drafting committee. Sutarjo and Hadikusumo were on the committee-of-eight but not the 
constitution-drafting committee, while Kahar Muzakkir and Abikusno were on the committee-of-nine but 
not the constitution-drafting committee.
71 Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 49. Supomo headed a seven-member constitution-drafting subcommittee, the 
membership of which, heavy with lawyers, included Wongsonegoro, Subarjo, Maramis, Singgih, Salim, 
and Sukiman. It should be noted that Supomo, together with Subarjo and Maramis, had developed a draft 
constitution in 1942 that they submitted to the BPUPK secretariat on June 15. That contained nothing 
specifically Islamic, and made mention of (limited) freedom of religion, in article 25 (Yamin, Naskah- 
Persiapan, p. 776). A draft provisional constitution, prepared by a seven-member group headed by Husein 
Jayadiningrat and including Supomo, had been submitted to the BPUPK on the same date (Kusuma, 
Lahirnya, pp. 49,191-97). That draft, while proposing that Indonesia be based on "nationalism, and God"
(kebangsaan, dan ketuhanan), contained nothing specific regarding Islam, though it included (clause 14) a 
guarantee of freedom of religious belief and practice (Kusuma, Lahirnya, pp. 192-96). It seems to have 
served as the working model for the draft produced by Supomo's group; four of its drafters were 
appointed to the nineteen-member constitution-drafting committee. It remains most unlikely, as noted 
above, that the draft constitution allegedly submitted to the BPUPK by Yamin, together with his speech 
(Yamin, Naskah-Persiapan, pp. 719-28), was actually produced at that time. Kusuma notes that Yamin's 
claim to have inserted his draft into the discussions of the constitution-drafting committee on July 11 
(Yamin, Naskah-Persiapan, p. 257) does not appear in the stenographic notes of that meeting (Kusuma, 
Lahirnya, pp. 543-49). Deliar Noer, who had access to Pringgodigdo's papers in 1955, noted gently that 
Yamin's text had made some changes to Pringgodigdo's notes (Noer, Partai Islam, p. 35n). See also 
Prawirosoedirdjo et al., Sejarah, pp. 110-11. Yamin's putative draft constitution bears no specifically 
Islamic cast. While its title carries the words "dengan Nama Allah, Pengasih dan Penjajang" ("in the Name
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It soon became apparent, however, that the Jakarta Charter "was far more difficult 
to sell than formulate,"72 and that the formula it contained had provoked considerable 
hostility both inside and outside the BPUPK assembly. During discussion by the 
constitution-drafting committee on July 11, the Ambonese Christian Johannes 
Latuharhary raised his disquiet about "the wording concerning 'Ke-Tuhanan,'" 
remarking that "the consequence would be very significant, for example for other 
religions," and noting a suggestion that the seven words might require Minangkabau 
people to abandon their customary law (adat), and even that customary land and 
inheritance rights in Maluku might be compromised.73 Sukarno's response was quick: 
"the preamble is the result of great effort to overcome differences in thinking between 
the group which is called nationalist and the Muslim group. Thus, if this sentence is 
not included, I am convinced that the Muslim side will not accept this preamble, and 
the quarrel will just continue."74 But that, together with Haji Agus Salim's efforts to 
minimize the problem of Minangkabau adat, could not silence the uneasiness; Husein 
Jayadiningrat wondered whether the words might occasion fanaticism, "for example, 
forcing people to pray, forcing people to perform the salat [the five obligatory daily 
prayers], and so on."75 Wahid Hasyim responded by reminding delegates that "if there 
is a representative body, that [the exercise of force] will not take place."76 Once more, 
Sukarno emphasized the fact that the matter had been a "compromise to put behind us 
the difficulties between us all. That compromise was achieved with the sweat of our 
brow."77 As chair of the drafting committee, he proceeded to declare the wording 
accepted and the matter finalized.
Two days later, amid further discussions within the drafting committee, Wahid 
Hasyim proposed that the president should be a Muslim, providing that person and 
the government an Islamic flavor that would enhance their authority.78 Further, he 
proposed that the words "the state religion is Islam" be inserted into the body of the 
constitution at article 29, with a rider guaranteeing freedom of religion to non- 
Muslims.79 His reason, he asserted, was a matter of national defense, since only religion
of Allah, the Beneficent and Merciful") (Yamin, Naskah-Persiapan, p. 721), its article 29 remarks that "the 
state is based on the One and Only God ("ke-Tuhanart Jang Maha Esa") and provides a state guarantee of 
"the freedom of every inhabitant to embrace any kind of religion, and to worship according to that 
religion and belief." The BPUPK also charged two other subcommittees with distinct tasks. Hatta headed a 
group responsible for developing policy on finance and the economy, while Abikusno chaired another on 
defense matters. Each of these subcommittees had twenty-three members. These subcommittees presented 
various reports to the BPUPK on July 16, which were received by the BPUPK on the following day 
(Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Singkat, pp. 29-30). Yamin was appointed to the finance and economy committee 
and not, as he must have wished, to Sukarno's constitution-drafting committee, and refused to accept his 
appointment. Sukarno expressed his regret that Yamin had not been appointed to the drafting committee 
and formally and unsuccessfully sought to have him included (Kusuma, Lahirnya, pp. 294-96, 297-99 [July 
11]). Yamin's displeasure with the turn of events is clear from his unwillingness to accept the draft 
constitution when a final vote to accept it was taken on July 16 (Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 432).
72 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 31. See also Anderson, Some 
Aspects, p. 31.
73 Latuharhary [speech of July 11], inKusuma, Lahirnya, p. 306.
74 Sukarno [speech of July 11], Ibid., p. 306.
75 Jayadiningrat [speech of July 11], Ibid., p. 307.
76 Hasyim [speech of July 11], Ibid.
77 Sukarno [speech of July 11], Ibid., p. 308.
78 Hasyim [speech of July 13], Ibid., p. 314.
79 Ibid.
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provided a rationale for the use of force, although his intention was probably to add 
flesh to the vague bones of the Jakarta Charter. Salim thought these changes clouded 
and unnecessarily problematized the original compromise, and wondered whether the 
matter might be decided by the parliament. Thus, "if the president must be a Muslim, 
what was the situation regarding the vice-president, ambassadors, and such like? What 
is the meaning of our agreement to protect other religions?"80 Jayadiningrat, arguing 
that in reality the president would always be a Muslim, thought Hasyim's prescription 
unnecessary, and, unlike Sukiman, that its maintenance would not be without 
consequence.81 In the end, committee chair Sukarno rejected both of Hasyim's 
suggestions.
When, on the following day, July 14, at a plenary session of the BPUPK, 
Hadikusumo advanced a further effort to heighten the import of the seven words by 
removing three of them, the words "bagi pemeluk-pemeluknja" (for its adherents),82 
Sukarno again opposed the move, emphasizing once more the fact that the earlier 
compromise had been based on "giving and taking"; it was "as good as possible."83 
Hadikusumo made a further effort to have the words removed, arguing that their 
specificity was insulting for Muslims;84 apparently he took offence that Muslims would 
be required to observe their law while adherents to other religions were placed under 
no such obligation. Again Sukarno opposed the notion, arguing that dispensing with 
those words "might be taken to mean that non-Muslims were required to carry out 
Islamic law."85 Hadikusumo protested that Sukarno's objection assumed that the 
government had a role to play in enforcing Islamic law, whereas in his view 
"government may not control religion" (pemerintah tidak boleh memeriksa agama).86 In the 
end, fellow Muslim Abikusno Cokrosuyoso—younger brother of the legendary 
Cokroaminoto—convinced Hadikusumo that, for the sake of peace and unity, things 
should be left as they were.87
In his elucidation of the draft at the plenary session next day, July 15, Supomo 
remarked that the seven words were an attempt by the state "to take note of the special 
character [keistimewaan] of the largest part of the population, the Muslims."88 The 
words were, as Supomo remarked, the result of a "gentlemen's agreement" [English], 
unanimously agreed upon by the drafting committee, between the "national group" 
and the "religious group"; therefore, "we must hold onto this article tenaciously so that 
we can unite those two groups."89 He noted as well that the drafting committee had
80 Salim [speech of July 13], Ibid., p. 314.
81 Jayadiningrat [speech of July 13], Ibid., p. 314.
82 Hadikusumo [speech of July 14], Ibid., pp. 328-29.
83 Sukarno [speech of July 14], Ibid., p. 329.
84 Hadikusumo [speech of July 14], Ibid., pp. 332-33. Hadikusumo was presumably the person mentioned 
by Ichibangase Yoshio as having protested against the form of the seven words (see "Uit het Verslag van 
Yoshio Ichibangase, Plaatsvervangend Voorzitter van de C.v.O., 2 November 1945," in Nederlands-Indi'e, 
ed. Brugmans et al., p. 589).
85 Sukarno [speech of July 14], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 333.
86 Hadikusumo [speech of July 14], Ibid., p. 333.
87 Cokrosuyoso [speech of July 14], Ibid., p. 334.
88 Supomo [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 358.
89 Ibid.
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agreed unanimously to the further step that the seven words should be entered into 
article 28 of the proposed constitution, so that it read: "The state is based upon God 
[Ketuhanan], with the obligation for its adherents to carry out Islamic law."90 Supomo 
also noted that the constitution contained a guarantee of religious freedom; "the State 
guarantees the freedom of each inhabitant to embrace a different religion and to 
worship according to that respective religion and its beliefs."91 The purport of the 
compromise, he went on, was that "the nationalist group may not reduce the guarantee 
to the Islamic group, and equally that the Islamic group may not seek more guarantees 
for Islam as against other religions."92 Indeed, he noted, in a situation of overwhelming 
Muslim numerical dominance, where Muslims "certainly have great influence in all 
kinds of fields," there was no need of guarantees.93
In the debate that followed, Sukiman conveyed a general sense of Muslim unease 
and suspicion. He remarked that the Dutch constitutional regulation had also 
guaranteed religious freedom, but "we as a Muslim community have experienced a 
situation that was at odds with that situation"; so-called religious neutrality had, in 
fact, meant a pro-Christian stand. He clearly implied that Muslims would effectively be 
discriminated against by the proposed "false" neutrality of the new state.94 Yamin, 
excluded from the drafting committee and not himself a member of the Muslim group, 
sought constitutional status for a number of specific ministries, including a Ministry of 
Muslim Affairs and an Islamic High Court that might provide judgments and advice 
about possible conflicts between the constitution and customary and Islamic law. 
Further, he argued, in the draft "popular sovereignty and the Muslim religion have not 
yet obtained a proper place and role."95 Supomo, concerned with the dangers of 
handing excessive power to the judiciary, took robust exception to Yamin's 
suggestions.96 Hadikusumo moved to the heart of the issue when he asked Supomo for 
a clarification of the meaning of the seven words.97 He was effectively fobbed off and 
gagged by Rajiman, in the chair, who thought the matter over and done with. 'Truly, I 
am being forced, forced by the chair, to accept this," Hadikusumo retorted, by now 
clearly highly irritated; he refused to accept article 28 (on religion) or the seven words 
as expressed in the preamble.98 The ten-minute break in proceedings called by Rajiman, 
apparently to cool matters, brought no respite. Abdul Fatah Hasan objected to the 
wording of the second clause in article 28 guaranteeing freedom of religion, because it 
could be read as suggesting that Muslims might freely abandon their religion for 
another one.99 Supomo did not object to the form of words Hasan proposed to remove 
the ambiguity.100 Latuharhary objected to the proposed change, however, which he




94 Sukiman [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 376.
95 Yamin [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 386.
96 Supomo [speech of July 15], Ibid., pp. 388-91.
97 Hadikusumo [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 413.
98 Hadikusumo [speech of July 15], Ibid., pp. 414-15.
99 Abdul Fatah Hasan [speech of July 15], Ibid., pp. 415-16.
100 Supomo [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 416.
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thought altered the essential sense of the clause; "the intention of the [drafting] 
Committee was to honor religion, not to honor the people embracing religion, but to 
honor religion."101 Pratalykama suggested, among other things, that the president 
should be Muslim;102 Supomo immediately responded that to mandate such a change 
would damage the compromise; "let us respect what has been agreed upon by both 
sides."103 Further, he argued, Muslim numerical superiority would bring its own 
reward in terms of influence. To interfere with the compromise, to reopen the matter, 
would involve further long debate ("two to three days would not be enough").104 Kiai 
Masykur again raised the question of the religion of the president, and particularly the 
practical and political difficulties that might arise if a non-Muslim president were 
elected, particularly the difficulty such a president would face in overseeing the 
obligation, now embedded in the draft constitution, that Muslims obey Islamic law.105 
As Supomo had done, Sukarno deflected this question by asserting that the president 
would always be a Muslim "if indeed the souls of the great majority of the people burn 
with the fire of Islam."106 Sukarjo Wiryopranoto added that he did not want a situation 
of having two classes of citizens, those who could occupy the position of president and 
those who could not.107 But the Muslim group, concerned at the prospect of a serious 
diminution of Islam's place, held firm in seeking its strong recognition in the 
constitution.
An informal, late-night meeting—the troubled plenary session had been suspended 
at 11:25 PM—between leaders of both Muslim and nationalist groups demonstrated the 
depth of difference between the two sides.108 But it also showed that compromise was 
necessary if a breakthrough were to be achieved, and it had to come from the 
nationalist side given apparent Muslim intransigence.109 The following morning, 
Sukarno, clearly unhappy—"there is greatness in sacrifice," he asserted—proposed 
that the meeting accept that the president must be a Muslim. It was a sacrifice of 
principle to practicality, indeed, "to the unity which we must quickly effect, so that we 
can quickly compile the Constitution; so that we can quickly achieve Free 
Indonesia,"110 even if its edge was softened by the recognition that any Indonesian 
president must inevitably be a Muslim. Only three members, all Sino-Indonesians, 
rejected the compromise. Once this matter was finalized, the assembly moved quickly 
to approve the draft constitution; the "declaration of independence" and the preamble 
were accepted unanimously.111
101 Latuharhary [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 416.
102 Pratalykama [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 416.
103 Supomo [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 418.
104 Ibid., p. 419.
105 Masykur [speech of July 15], Ibid., pp. 419-20.
106 Sukarno [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 420.
107 Wiryopranoto [speech of July 15], Ibid., p. 422.
108 Ananda B. Kusuma, "Catatan seputar Simposium 'Restorasi Pancasila/" in Restorasi Pancasila: 
Mendamaikan Politik Identitas dan Modernitas, ed. Irfan Nasution and Rortny Agustinus (Bogor: Brighten 
Press, 2006), p. 422.
109 Noer, Partai Islam, p. 37.
110 Sukarno [speech of July 16], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 428.
111 Rajiman to Head of Japanese Military Government, July 18,1945, Ibid., p. 463. The BPUPK's 
considerations were intended by the Japanese to raise and air general questions, to be finalized, without
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The PPKI
A month and a day after the draft constitution was approved, Indonesia declared 
its independence in a manner and with a speed no one had anticipated. Subsequent to 
the conclusion of the BPUPK's considerations in mid-July, Field-Marshal Terauchi 
Hisaichi, commander of the Japanese Southern Area armies, had made it known that 
the transfer of sovereignty should take place in mid-September and moved to establish 
the machinery to bring Indonesia to a more or less orderly independence.112 On August 
7, the local Japanese administration announced the establishment of a Committee for 
the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan 
Indonesia, PPKI), and formalized that body on August 12, with Terauchi appointing 
Sukarno at its head.113 ft was planned that the PPKI meet on August 19 to finalize the 
constitution,114 but the momentous events of early and mid-August—the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the unconditional surrender of the 
Japanese—changed expectations fundamentally. The PPKI was not, like the BPUPK, a 
Java-focused body, but, in the interests of regional and ethno-religious representation, 
included five representatives from the Japanese naval (Kaigun) area of eastern 
Indonesia as well as one Chinese-Indonesian and, after some delay caused by the 
prevarication by the 25th Army in Sumatra (which was skeptical of and repressive 
towards Indonesian nationalist sentiment115), three representatives from Sumatra.116
The PPKI body met for the first time in the late morning of August 18, the day after 
the proclamation of Indonesia's independence. Its twenty-seven members117 moved 
quickly to finalize and formally adopt the draft constitution produced by the BPUPK. 
In the doing, such limited gains as had been made by the Muslim group in the BPUPK 
were entirely erased.
prejudice, by a later commission. The BPUPK's success, essentially under Sukarno's impetus, in finalizing 
a draft constitution went much further than the Japanese had intended or expected. See "Uit het Verslag 
van Generaal-Majoor Moichiro Yamamoto" and "Uit het Verslag van Yoshio Ichibangase," pp. 586, 588. 
See also Kusuma, "Catatan," p. 419n.
112 "Cablegram from General Terauchi, Supreme Chief of Staff, I Corps, to Deputy Chief (Vice-Minister) of 
Independence for the East Indies" [August 2,1945], in Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, ed. 
Benda, Irikura, and Kishi, pp. 275-76.
113Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 13. According to Hatta, on August 12, in Dalat, Terauchi told Sukarno, Hatta, and 
Rajiman that "it's up to you to realize your independence; the Japanese government is willing to grant it. 
When [that happens] is up to the Preparatory Committee" (emphasis in original; Hatta, paraphrased 
interview with George Kahin, Jakarta, March 10,1959, Kahin Collection).
114 Soetan Sjahrir, Out o f Exile, trans. Charles Wolf, Jr. (reprinted New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1969 
[1949]), pp. 253-54; "Comite voor het Onderzoek naar Maatregelen ter Voorbereiding van de 
Onafhankelijkheid" [November 3, 1945], Ministerie van Defensie, Collectie archieven Strijdkrachten in 
Nederlands-Indie, (1938-39) 1941-57 [1960], no. 24, Nationaal Archief, The Hague. A number of sources 
suggest that the first meeting of the PPKI was in fact planned for August 18 (Anderson, Some Aspects, p. 
34).
115 Audrey Kahin, "Struggle for Independence: West Sumatra in the Indonesian National Revolution, 
1945-1950" (PhD dissertation, Cornell University, 1979), pp. 73, 89-91.
116 Anderson, Some Aspects, pp. 61, 63.
117 The PPKI originally had twenty-one members, but Sukarno added six new members just before the first 
meeting of the PPKI on August 18, including a senior Muslim figure, Kasman Singodimejo.
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Hatta's role in the matter was crucial. He later related that on the evening of 
August 17, he had received a "Japanese navy officer" (opsir kaigun) at the behest of and 
together with Nishijima Shigetada, assistant to Rear-Admiral Maeda Tadashi. That 
"opsir" brought to him the news that Christian nationalists from eastern Indonesia 
were unwilling to adopt the constitution and would "prefer to stand outside the 
Republic of Indonesia" unless the "seven words" of the Jakarta Charter were 
omitted.118 Hatta remarked that these men felt that the insertion of the seven words in 
the constitution discriminated against them as a religious minority.119 The implication 
of this news—that Indonesia might be rent asunder at the moment of its birth, with 
dire consequences for the struggle that lay ahead—led him, he claimed, to move 
rapidly to eliminate the problem.120
Early the following morning, at a hastily convened meeting with Muslim members 
of the PPKI,121 Hatta convinced them—the meeting lasted just fifteen minutes, he later 
related122—of the urgent need, for the sake of national unity, to accede to the demand 
to remove the seven words and, as well, to tone down other parts of the draft that 
appeared to privilege Islam. When the PPKI eventually convened, two hours after its 
scheduled beginning,123 Hatta quickly moved to implement the crucial changes. He 
was already assured of success as a result of the earlier meeting. Thus, in arguing for 
the removal of the stipulation that the president be a Muslim, he remarked that 
"agreement in this matter has also been obtained between the different groups, which 
facilitates our work at this time."124 Sukarno himself noted that, before the session, 
some members had flagged a desire for changes in the draft, and that "we" had held 
discussions with "various members" that had resulted in "agreement."125 126Accordingly, 
in his short address, Hatta proposed that the preamble be named "Pembukaan" rather 
than the Arabic for preamble, "Mukadimah," presumably to distinguish it from the 
longer preamble of the draft constitution, and probably as well to assert its religious 
neutrality; further, he urged that the draft joint "declaration of independence" (heavy 
with pro-Japanese sentiment) and preamble be excised and replaced by the original 
Jakarta Charter of June 22.126 More important, he urged that the words "the One and
118 Mohammad Hatta, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945 (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1969), p. 57. These persons 
from eastern Indonesia were presumably among those five members of the PPKI appointed from the 
Japanese naval area (the Menadonese G. S. S. J. Ratulangi, the Ambonese Johannes Latuharhary, Andi 
Pangeran from Sulawesi, A. A. Hamidhan from Borneo, and the Balinese I Gusti Ktut Puja). It is clear that 
the five had serious misgivings about the implications of the proposed position of Islam in the draft 
constitution. A report on their activities may be found in "Rapport over de Reis van Dr Ratulangi in 
Augustus 1945 van Makassar naar Batavia," Ministerie van Defensie, Collectie archieven Strijdkrachten in 
Nederlands-Indie, (1938-39) 1941-57 [1960], no. 24, Nationaal Archief, The Hague.
119 Hatta, Sekitar, p. 57.
120 Ibid., pp. 57-58.
121 Hatta (Ibid., p. 58) claims that these Muslims were Hadikusumo, Hasyim, Kasman Singodimejo, and the 
Acehnese Teuku Hasan. Contrary to Hatta's recollection twenty-five years later, Hasyim did not attend.
122 Ibid., p. 59.
123 Sidik Kertapati, Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945, 3rd ed. (Jakarta: Jajasan "Pembaruan," 1964), p. 123.
124 Hatta [speech of August 18], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 471.
125 Sukarno [speech of August 18], Ibid., p. 469. According to Kasman, Sukarno had not involved himself in 
the lobbying, partly because of his position as chair of the assembly and partly because of his uneasiness 
and embarrassment at what Hatta was proposing to the Muslim group (Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun 
Kasman, Hidup, p. 123).
126 Hatta [speech of August 18], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 469.
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Only" (Yang Maha Esa) be attached to "God" (Ketuhanan), and that the "seven words" 
in the original Charter be deleted from the preamble. "If [we can agree with that] 
without too much debate [dengan doorhameren]," he remarked, "in a few minutes we 
can validate this Constitution of ours."127
In the assembly's subsequent discussion, at the suggestion of I Gusti Ktut Puja, the 
delegate from Bali, the word "Allah" in the preamble was replaced by the more generic 
"Tuhan" (Lord),128 while the stipulation that the president be a Muslim was erased, 
partly because of the inevitability that the president would be Muslim, and also so that 
"the whole of the Constitution can be accepted by the regions in Indonesia which are 
not Muslim, like those regions now run by the Kaigun."129 Article 29, on religion, was 
similarly amended to remove the seven words; the relevant clause now read: 'The 
state is based on the One and Only God" (Negara berdasar atas ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa).130
The Muslim group's defeat on August 18 was soon heavily underlined when the 
assembly moved the following day to establish the administrative machinery of 
independent government, including the establishment of twelve ministries. The three- 
person committee established for the purpose by Sukarno recommended the creation 
of a Ministry of Religious Affairs among the thirteen it proposed.131 But Latuharhary 
considered that such an entity would inevitably ruffle sensitivities—"we do not need 
to awaken feelings which might make for a lack of trust within our nation"132—and 
suggested rather establishing a Bureau of Religion within the Ministry of Education, a 
move that would have the added advantage of saving money. Ki Hajar Dewantoro 
suggested that such a bureau would more appropriately be inserted in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs.133 In the end, the proposal for a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs 
was rejected, receiving only six votes,134 and "religion" was packaged as a segment of 
the Ministry of Education, Instruction, and Culture.135 Later, only two Muslim leaders 
were appointed to the new nation's first cabinet, and their positions were not 
prominent. Abikusno, perhaps the most accommodating of the Muslim figures, 
became Minister of Communications, while Wahid Hasyim was appointed as a 
portfolio-free Minister of State.136 And when the PPKI established the quasi- 
parliamentary Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP, Central Indonesian National
127 Ibid., p. 472.
1281 Gusti Ktut Puja [speech of August 18], Ibid., p. 474. Strangely, the old wording remained intact in the 
text of the constitution officially gazetted in Berita Repoeblik Indonesia, February 15,1946, and remains part 
of the constitution to this day.
129 Hatta [speech of August 18], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 471.
130 Ibid., pp. 473-91.
131 Subarjo [speech of August 19], Ibid., pp. 512-13. Its members were Subarjo, Sutarjo, and Kasman (p. 
500).
132 Latuharhary [speech of August 19], Ibid., p. 515.
133 Dewantoro [speech of August 19], Ibid., p. 516.
134 Ibid., p. 519.
135 Sukarno [speech of August 19], Ibid., p. 524.
136 Nasution, "The Islamic State," p. 68.
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Committee) later in August, that body's membership was even less representative of 
expressly Muslim sentiment than its parent body.137
Many puzzles persist about this sudden and portentous change. Why was Hatta so 
easily convinced by the so-called threat to divide the just-born Republic? What was the 
nature of the threat, given that the seven words applied only to Muslims and did not 
affect non-Muslims? Why did Sukarno and Hatta not defend and maintain the 
compromises reached and agreed upon by the BPUPK? How could it be that the 
laboriously arrived-at "gentlemen's agreement," engineered by Sukarno himself, could 
be changed "in just a few minutes."138 And why did the Muslim leadership cave in to 
Hatta's newly expressed fears and anxiety so rapidly—the sessions of August 18 lasted 
only a little over two hours—and without resistance? Indeed, not a single protest or 
question was raised in the chamber concerning "this most important change" which, 
Hatta remarked, "unites the whole nation."139
To seek answers, one must first look at the composition of PPKI, which was even 
less Islamist in its membership than was the BPUPK. The PPKI included only sixteen 
members of the BPUPK, and its membership had been broadened to include 
representatives from Bali, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Only three PPKI members could be 
said unambiguously to be Islamic figures: Wahid Hasyim, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, and 
Kasman Singodimejo, commander of the Jakarta Peta battalion.140 Indeed, only three of 
the original nine signatories of the original Jakarta Charter were present at the PPKI on 
this day, none of them representing the "Muslim group"; Wahid Hasyim, traveling 
from Surabaya, was absent until the second day of proceedings, August 19.141 That 
numerical weakness left the Muslim group gravely exposed, but does not of itself 
explain the passivity of the Muslim group that had been so vociferous in its defense of 
Islam's place in the state just a month before, in the BPUPK discussions.
Hatta might have been secure in the belief that he enjoyed sufficient voting power 
in the PPKI to ensure that his proposals would be endorsed. But why did he choose to 
act as he did, just at that time? He later explained that
... the reason for it was that there was a great burden for the other side which 
was non-Muslim. To their way of thinking, it was not proper in a major 
statement that concerned the whole nation for there to be a provision which 
concerned only one part of the people of Indonesia, even if that part was the 
largest one. A provision of that kind can always be made as a legal regulation 
with the Constitution through the parliament. In order to guard the unity and 
wholeness of all the regions of Indonesia, that part of the sentence "with the
137 Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time o f Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944^-1946 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 101. See also Nasution, "The Islamic State," p. 68.
138 Mangkusasmito, Pertumbuhan, p. 19.
139 Hatta [speech of August 18], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 471.
140 None of the three Sumatran representatives (Abdul Abbas, Amir, and Muhammad Hasan) was a 
Muslim leader. All were Dutch educated, two in law and one in medicine.
141 Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 500 and n.; Endang Saifuddin Anshari, Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945: Sebuah 
Konsensus Nasional tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia (1945-1949) (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1997), 
p. 52.
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obligation for its adherents to observe Islamic law" was excised from the 
Preamble to the Constitution.142
There is no doubt that Hatta sympathized with the view that the Islamic specificity 
of the preamble "gave the impression of differentiating between citizens who were 
Muslims and citizens who were not."143 While he "was certainly not a secularist"144—if 
by that term is meant someone who believes in the complete separation of religion and 
the state—he strongly held the view that religion, as such, should not interfere with 
matters properly deemed those of the state, that it not impose itself through means 
outside those of normal democratic process, and that it should not itself form the basis 
of the state.145 Nonetheless, he had himself signed the original Jakarta Charter and had 
given every appearance up to that time that he had accepted the vague compromise it 
involved. There was nothing in his general disposition nor in any of his utterances to 
suggest that he had conspired to seize this moment of Muslim weakness in a callous 
press to install his own, preferred vision of free Indonesia, notwithstanding Kasman's 
view that "the side of the non-Muslim minority was very cunning" in seizing the 
"psychological moment" to advance their "sensitive proposal" by exploiting the need 
at this crucial time for total national unity.146
While he did not seek to exploit it, Hatta was, indeed, keenly aware of the central 
importance of national unity at this crucial, strained time, with the legitimacy of the 
independence proclaimed uncertain and its longevity far from assured, given the 
expected arrival of Allied troops. Maeda himself noted that "it was clear to the 
Indonesian leaders that they would have a much stronger case and a greater chance of 
success in their struggle if the whole of Indonesia was united."147 But why did Hatta 
take so seriously the sudden threat to disunity posed by the eastern Indonesian 
delegation, especially if it were delivered by an opsir kaigun whose name Hatta could 
not even recollect?148 Perhaps it was the intercession of Nishijima, a strong supporter 
(as was Maeda) of Indonesian nationalist aspirations, that impressed Hatta. But it is 
perhaps more likely, as Van Klinken suggests, that the opsir was none other than 
Ratulangi himself, or that Ratulangi's message was brought to Hatta by a group of 
non-Muslim student activists with whom he had become acquainted in Jakarta and 
who were similarly opposed to the seven words, and that it was the immediacy and
142 Panitia Lima, Uraian Pancasila, pp. 32-33. The Panitia Lima was a five-person committee whose 
membership consisted of Hatta, Subarjo, Maramis, Sunario, and A. G. Pringgodigdo. It was established in 
late 1974 to respond to what its members took as New Order deviations from the original meaning of 
Pancasila. It submitted a report of its conclusions to President Suharto in mid-1975.
143 "Wasiat Bung Hatta kepada Guntur Soekarno Putra" [June 16,1978], in Abdoelmanap, Republik 
Indonesia Menggugat, p. 172.
144 Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, "The Politic of Salt, not Politics of Lipstick: Mohammad Hatta on Islam and 
Nationalism," Studia Islamika 9,2 (2002): 94.
145 Among other evidence, see Anonymous, Bung Hatta's Answers: Interviews with Dr. Mohammad Hatta with 
Dr. Z. Yasni (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981), p. 61.
146Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup, pp. 121-22. Kasman, appointed only that morning to the 
PPKI, noted upon his arrival at the venue the lobbying in process, which was "very tense and sharp."
147 "Interrogation of Rear Admiral Maeda Tadashi, at Changi Gaol, Singapore Island, between 31st May 
and 14th June, 1946," Indische Collectie, no. 6902, NIOD.
148 Hatta, Sekitar, p. 57.
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stridency of this mission that impressed Hatta.149 Whatever the case, it is clear that the 
news of the eastern Indonesian opposition, and his apprehension of the seriousness of 
its intent and the extreme danger it represented to the nascent Republic, are what 
moved Hatta to action. As he later remarked, "it was a mistake to have this clause kept 
in the preamble of our national Constitution, since a preamble should provide a 
common basis for the whole population, not just the Muslim population of 
Indonesia."150 It was, he said in his address to the PPKI, "the desire of all of us to assert 
an Indonesian nation in its wholeness ... in this critical period, we need a complete 
unity, [and thus] the clauses that have caused contention have been removed from the 
Constitution."151
But how, having determined that he should move to rectify the problem, did Hatta 
persuade the Muslim group, which included Hadikusumo with his stubborn 
attachment to the notion of the Islamic state, to acquiesce? In Hasyim's absence, there 
were only two persons to convince: Hadikusumo himself and Kasman, since Teuku 
Hasan was notable for his ule'ebalang (customary nobility) background rather than any 
attachment to Islamist thinking.
Four things seem to have been crucial in securing Muslim acquiescence. First, like 
Hatta himself, Hadikusumo and Kasman were aware of the critical situation and the 
need to develop the institutions of the newly proclaimed state as speedily as possible. 
Rapid and effective action depended entirely upon national unity; its absence might 
threaten a disastrous fissiparousness within the political leadership that might easily 
have imperiled the independence so recently asserted. That alone, however, does not 
necessarily explain the Muslim decision to accede to Hatta's demands; the BPUPK 
debate and its aftermath on July 15 had shown, indeed, how Muslim stubbornness, 
rather than capitulation, could reap rapid rewards.
Second, it seems that the Muslim group was apparently attracted by the formula 
presented by Hatta that spoke of "the One and Only God" (as noted earlier). Kasman 
thought the formulation "extremely important," since it conveyed the specifically 
Muslim emphasis on the oneness and uniqueness of God.152 That, however, can only 
have been an ancillary consideration, since Hatta's demands were for a diminution of 
Islam's importance for the state, and his new formulation can hardly have been 
attractive in its own right.
Third, and much more important, the assurances given by Hatta about the 
prospects in the near future for adjusting Islam's position in regard to the state seem to
149 Gerry van Klinken, Minorities, Modernity, and the Emerging Nation: Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical 
Approach (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2003), pp. 230-31. Ratulangi, of course, was an employee of the Japanese 
navy administration. For a generally similar account, see Ridwan Saidi, Status "Piagam Jakarta": Tinjauan 
Hukum dan Sejarah (Jakarta: Direktorat Pers, Publikasi dan Penerbitan LBH PP-GPI, 2007), pp. 25-29, 43- 
44. If this scenario is accurate, it removes the legitimacy for Hatta's subsequent actions that a genuine 
friendly Japanese intervention might lend and makes his uncharacteristic "forgetfulness" on the matter of 
the opsir kaigun's identity understandable. Nishijima, indeed, later reportedly asserted that "I did not bring 
an officer to Bung Hatta's house" (Amran Nasution et al., "Menit-Menit Menentukan di Pejambon,"
Tempo, August 19,1989, ppmajalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/email/1989/08/19/NAS/mbm.19890819. 
NAS23378.id.html, accessed May 7, 2009).
150 Hatta, paraphrased interview with Kahin, Jakarta, March 10,1959.
151 Hatta [speech of August 18], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 470.
152Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup, pp. 124-25.
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have played heavily in the Muslim group's considerations. Hatta himself admitted that 
he suggested that efforts to impose syariah formally upon the Muslim community 
could later be drafted for passage through the parliament once the constitution had 
been approved.153 He noted later that "It was agreed finally that such a provision 
relating exclusively to the Muslim population could be established later by law—but 
that it should not be part of the constitution."154 Kasman's recollection was rather 
different: "Finally we accepted the promise of Bung Karno, that is, that six months later 
the Representatives of the Indonesian Nation would gather in the forum of the 
People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) to determine 
a perfected Constitution, as ... can also be read in the final part of the 1945 
Constitution."155 That promise, according to Kasman, was crucial in bringing 
Hadikusumo to agree to Hatta's proposed changes.156 At the subsequent session of the 
PPKI, Sukarno indeed asserted that "the Constitution which has been made now is a 
provisional Constitution ... a lightning Constitution," and promised that "in a calmer 
atmosphere, we will certainly reassemble the People's Consultative Assembly, which 
can make a more complete and more perfect Constitution."157
Hatta, of course, clearly preferred that matters of this kind be handled by 
parliamentary legislation rather than by means of constitutional fixity, and had 
witnessed Sukarno's suggestion in his Pancasila speech that Muslim electoral success 
would mean that "the laws which emerge from the People's Representative Council 
will be Islamic laws."158 Introducing laws of the kind Hatta suggested would not have 
been difficult given a Muslim parliamentary majority, and would not have offended 
either Hatta's or Sukarno's proclaimed democratic sensibilities. But Hatta may have 
been tempted to signal, however vaguely, to the Muslim group, themselves 
inexperienced in politics, the prospect of constitutional reengineering once elections 
had been held. Muslim leaders, until their expectations were punctured by the results 
of the 1955 parliamentary and Constituent Assembly elections, were perennially 
encouraged by the thought that elections would see them assume the majority position 
in politics that they viewed as their right.159 The vision of creating a new constitution 
with its basis in Islam—a great improvement on the position they were now being 
asked to forfeit—must have been a powerful incentive to the Muslim group to 
accommodate Hatta's demands in a situation that urgently required national unity.
153 Hatta, Sekitar, p. 59-60.
154 Hatta, paraphrased interview withKahin, Jakarta, March 10,1959.
155 Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup, p. 124. See also pp. 135, 209-13. Kasman himself notes, 
however, that Sukarno was not present at the early morning meeting preceding the PPKI session. Kasman 
made a similar case in an address to the Constituent Assembly more than a decade after the proclamation, 
adding the important rider that the proposed MPR meeting would be used "to enter the Islamic material 
into the permanent Constitution" (Anonymous, Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante 
(Bandung/Jakarta, n.p., 1958?) p. 239.
156 Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup, p. 129.
157 Sukarno [speech of August 18], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 479. That undertaking was adopted later that 
day as one of the transitional provisions of the constitution (Kusuma, Lahirnya, pp. 498-99).
158 Sukarno [speech of June 1], Ibid., p. 161.
159 See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1962), pp. 274-75.
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Finally, and most important of all, it was probably the case that the Muslim group 
did not need much persuading to accept Hatta's proposals. Kasman's role was 
reportedly pivotal in convincing the hardline Islamist Hadikusumo finally to agree to 
the proposed changes,160 and that role might well have included signaling the prospect 
of a greater constitutional victory for Islam when normality had returned, elections 
were held, and the MPR finally convened. Hadikusumo was, after all, being requested 
by Hatta to acquiesce to the erasure of a position to which he had never strongly 
adhered. Hadikusumo was, above everything—as his BPUPK address of May 31 made 
clear—thoroughly wedded to the notion of an Islamic state. He saw the Jakarta Charter 
with its vague formulation of the seven words as a purposely and misleadingly 
distracting arrangement that conveniently masked the secularist inclinations of most 
members of the BPUPK assembly. His position seems to have been that, in the absence 
of an Islamic state, such guarantees as the seven words provided were meaningless, at 
least if an essentially secular government were to be expected to enforce religious 
behavior, and that the notion of a compromise between secular and Muslim groups 
was an insulting crumb thrown to the Muslim group by the dominant nationalists to 
obtain its support.161
In the end, Muslim agreement to the proposed changes was a response to a variety 
of conditions and possibilities. It was partly a consequence of the Muslim group's own 
realization of the dire circumstances facing the newly proclaimed Republic, and 
especially the Republic's need to establish itself formally without any delay, given the 
presently expected arrival of Allied forces.162 There was a need to move, as Sukarno 
implored, "like lightning"; Oto Iskandardinata pleaded that "we only talk about those 
things that are urgent."163 The Muslim group was as deeply attached to the notion of 
independence as any other. Months before the proclamation, Hasyim had asserted that 
"national unity that is strong and firm is very necessary at this time"; indeed, he had 
asked "how can we situate Religion in a Free Indonesia without sacrificing national 
unity, which is so necessary at this time?"164 Like most of his fellows, he wished to 
privilege the attainment of independence rather than obdurately insisting on a 
religious basis for the state. In that context, Hatta's assurances that the matter of the 
special place of Islam in the Republic could be addressed again at a calmer and less 
fraught time were enough to convince the Muslim group to concede, if only 
temporarily.
Muslim Recrimination?
Hatta later expressed the view that the PPKI "made only a few alterations, which 
were not concerned with essentials" to the draft constitution prepared by the
160 Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup, pp. 128-29; Lukman Harun, "Pak Kasman dan Pengesahan 
UUD 1945," in Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup, p. 279; Sudarnoto AZ, "A Biography of Ki 
Bagus Hadikusumo Erly [sic] Youth and Education," Mizan 2,1 (1985): 93-94.
161 See Hadikusumo [speech of July 15], in Kusuma, Lahirnya, p. 425.
162 Kusuma, Lahirnya, pp. 469, 524, emphasis in original.
163 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
164 A. Wahid Hasjim, in Asia Raya, May 11,1945. Another writer remarked that "we welcome this Free 
Indonesia, which will also guarantee that the religion of Islam thrives" (Soekrisno, " Agama Islam Sedjalan 
dengan Kebangsaan," Asia Raya, July 23,1945).
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BPUPK.165 Kasman's address less than two weeks later as the newly elected head of the 
freshly inaugurated Indonesian National Committee celebrated Indonesia's 
independence and its unity, and carried no sense of division or disappointment.166 
Wahid Hasyim, as far as is known, made no public complaint about what had 
transpired in the August 18 session that he had missed. But later, the constitutional 
changes engineered by Hatta became a continuing source of Muslim bitterness, 
nourished by the deepening failure of Islamism to gain political traction in post­
independence Indonesia. According to Mohamad Rum, the removal of the seven 
words gave the Muslim community "a feeling of disappointment."167 The Muslim 
group's concession to Hatta's proposal for change gradually resulted in a deep sense of 
having lost out to the small non-Muslim minority, "as if the Muslim community in 
Indonesia was forbidden to observe Islam law."168 Kasman's biographers thought this 
acquiescence a "mistake ... the consequence of which has been suffered by the Muslim 
community for a prolonged period up to now," while Kasman himself regretted his 
actions.169 Hadikusumo, indeed, allegedly made his anger known at a meeting of 
Muhammadiyah's Majelis Tanwir in Yogyakarta just days after the PPKI concluded.170 
Natsir later bitterly recalled the turnabout as "the day of the ultimatum by the 
Christian Indonesian community from the East ... God-willing, the Muslim 
community will not forget."171 By contrast, the Suharto-era Minister of Religious 
Affairs, General Alamsyah Prawiranegara, patronizingly called it "a sacrifice and a gift 
of the Muslim community," a consequence of that community's wish "to shape unity 
in freedom."172
Hooker and Lindsey have noted that "the missing words of the Piagarn Jakarta have 
never disappeared from the debate on what the state of Indonesia is supposed to 
represent for Islam."173 Ahmad wrote that the problem of the Islamic state remained "a 
very big problem."174 According to Noer, "the fighting spirit to attain Islamic law in 
Indonesia has clearly never been extinguished... After we obtained independence, the 
effort to attain Islamic law has also never ceased."175 In March 1968, in the early years
165 Mohammad Hatta, "Legende dan Realiteit sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus," in Osman Raliby, Documenta 
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Bintang, 1953), p. 658.
166 Pusat Komite Nasional Indonesia, Negara Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: Mu tiara, 1945), pp. 47-48.
167 Mohamad Roem, "Kata Pengantar," in Anshari, Piagam Jakarta, p. xiii.
168 Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman, Hidup, p. 126.
169 Ibid., p. 213; Harun, "Pak Kasman," pp. 279-80.
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of the New Order, Muslim parties in the provisional MPR pressed strongly for the 
inclusion of the original Jakarta Charter in the constitution.176 Speaking at a seminar in 
July 1968 in Malang on the "Development of Islamic Community," the speaker of the 
MPRS (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, Provisional People's Consultative 
Assembly), the devout Muslim General A. H. Nasution, "rejected the idea of founding 
an Islamic state, but he approved Muslims' request to get the Jakarta Charter legalized. 
This would then allow a religious community to live fully in accordance with their 
religious values and norms."177 Some Muslims have suggested or claimed that the 
removal of the seven words was the result of dishonest politics and even of some kind 
of conspiracy.178 Others again have claimed that, since the Jakarta Charter had, in 1959, 
been proclaimed by Sukarno as having inspired the constitution, the seven words, in 
fact, remained in force; "the Jakarta Charter cannot—I emphasize cannot—be 
separated from the 1945 Constitution."179 Others again saw the words' reintroduction 
as "one solution for solving the problem of this country."180
Some observers have claimed that the subsequent establishment of a Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (purportedly to advance the interests of all recognized religions in 
Indonesia) in January 1946 was a means of satisfying Muslim sentiment outraged at the 
events of the morning of August 18. There is, however, little evidence to support that 
view. Hatta makes no mention of such an arrangement in his account.181 The official 
version of the ministry's establishment attributed its foundation to the need to fulfill 
constitutional requirements, notably article 29, which determined that "the state is 
based on the one and only God" and its subsequent guarantee of religious freedom 
and practice.182 Thereby, remarked Noer, probably with a wry sense of paradox, 
Pancasila "has been regarded as justifying the existence of the Ministry of Religion."183 
One can more generally agree with Noer's view that "the Ministry of Religious Affairs
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was established by the government to meet the wishes of the Islamic-oriented 
people/'184 as well, of course, as to provide enhanced—and much needed—popular 
support for the Syahrir government in both its internal and external struggles.185 That 
the proposal for the ministry's establishment, first mooted in November 1945, was 
readily accepted by the government186 indicates that there was no perceived close 
connection between the events of August 18 and the ministry's creation. Wahid 
Hasyim himself later attributed the ministry's establishment to the purely practical 
need for better coordination of matters concerning religion, which was preferable to 
having them mixed-up and scattered through different departments; it was, Hasyim 
remarked, "a middle way between the theory of the separation of religion from the 
state and the theory of the unity of religion and the state."187 The ministry gave 
Muslims significantly enhanced political and bureaucratic power and access to state 
resources,188 but nothing like an Islamic state. In a 1951 speech, Hasyim remarked that 
"the Government is not an Islamic Government, the State of the Republic of Indonesia 
is not an Islamic State, and the Ministry of Religion is not a Ministry of the Religion of 
Islam," noting "the error in thinking" that "arose from the well-known theory of the 
unity of state and religion previously held by those of wrong opinion."189
Notwithstanding the vexed discourse on the Jakarta Charter that continues to this 
day, it is clear that Hatta's revisions were not a cause of conjecture and aggravated 
debate in the early years of independence. While many Muslims were dissatisfied with 
the PPKI's final work, they recognized that the time had not been appropriate to make 
a potentially damaging stand.190 While many Muslim leaders were miffed at the slight 
allegedly done to them and their religion by the removal of the seven words, they 
accepted the Pancasila as a workable compromise that harmonized in a general sense 
with Islamic principles,191 and which provided space for them to clarify and press their 
larger claims. Hasyim Asy'ari noted in 1946 that
When our respected Prophet Muhammad, God bless him, passed away, he did 
not leave any message about how to choose a head of state ... Thus, the 
appointment of a head of state and many other things concerning statehood 
have been left undefined, [and Muslims were] not bound to one system to 
construct [them]. All [systems can] apply to the Islamic community in any place 
[or time].192
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So, when the 1949 federal constitution and its successor, the 1950 unitary 
constitution, were developed, Islamists made no move to reinstate the seven words, 
even though the Pancasila section of the preamble remained essentially unchanged 
from the 1945 version. That remained the case even when men like Natsir and Sukiman 
held the post of prime minister in the early 1950s.193 Though the loss of the seven 
words was remembered, as elections for the parliament and the Constituent Assembly 
loomed the focus for Muslim activists was rather on the attainment of a full-fledged 
Islamic state, something that substantial electoral success might help to realize.194 That 
view confirmed the fact that the original Jakarta Charter was not a victory for Islamist 
activists, but rather a vague, purely symbolic and patronizing concession made to them 
by the dominant secularist political grouping at a time of national emergency. It was, 
indeed, a mark of the activists' signal failure, as Hadikusumo's fierce opposition to it in 
the BPUPK debates had so clearly demonstrated.
Much Ado?
One final question merits consideration, notwithstanding its hypothetical character: 
What if Hatta had done nothing in response to the alleged threat of the Christians of 
eastern Indonesia? It seems difficult to argue that it would have made any substantial 
difference to the subsequent substantial trajectory of the nation's history. It seems 
unlikely in the extreme that men like Ratulangi and Latuharhary, both longtime 
supporters of a free Indonesia, with the latter having voted for the original Jakarta 
Charter in the BPUPK, much less Maramis, a member of the Panitia Sembilan that had 
drafted the document and who was himself a signatory to it, might have led or 
championed a decision by the Kaigun regions to disassociate themselves from the new 
Indonesian Republic and perhaps establish some independent entity. That price would 
have been too high simply to oppose a policy that directly affected only Muslims. Had 
the seven words remained in the preamble and the body of the constitution, there was 
no prospect under any of the early governments of the Republic—even those led by 
Islamists like Natsir and Sukiman—both during the difficult days of the revolution and 
afterwards and much less under the mature Republic presided over by Sukarno or 
Suharto, of the introduction of an Islamist interpretation of the Jakarta Charter. There 
remains none today, as the constitutional amendment process of 2002 demonstrated.195 
All of which leads me to conclude that the changes engineered by Hatta on August 18, 
1945, were panicked and unnecessary. Moreover, in the sense that they gave Islamists 
the opportunity to invent a superficially credible and, episodically, a politically useful 
narrative of state victimization, discrimination, and repression, they were probably 
deeply counterproductive as well.
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